Кафедра політології

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Browsing Кафедра політології by Author "Burkovskyi, Petro"

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    The EU and Ukraine's Public Opinion: Changing Dynamic
    (2022) Haran, Olexiy; Burkovskyi, Petro
    After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukrainian society and political establishment chose a different path of transformation than Russia. Ukraine gained its independence peacefully and without internal conflicts thanks to an agreement between the national-democratic opposition and the so called "nationalcommunists". The West appreciated the facts that 1) Ukraine was the first state from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to re-elect both president and parliament in the 1994 democratic elections; 2) in contrast to Russia’s 1993 constitution, which established a model of creeping authoritarianism in that it placed massive authority on the president, Ukraine’s 1996 constitution was a compromise between the president and parliament; 3) again in contrast to Russia, political opposition in Ukraine was much stronger. In fact, only one president, Leonid Kuchma (1994–2004) was reelected. The rest, except fugitive Viktor Yanukovych (2010–2014), lost elections to their opposition rivals. In parliamentary elections opposition parties defeated ruling rivals in 2006, 2007 and 2019. All Ukrainian governments also had to take the interests of the country’s different regions into account. Thus, this system was much more balanced than the Russian model. From the point of view of Western political science, "pluralism by default" emerged in Ukraine, i.e. unplanned and unintentional pluralism.
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    Fighting for Freedom: Ukrainian Assessment of the Implications of the Russian Invasion for South Asia
    (2022) Haran, Olexiy; Burkovskyi, Petro
    Since the 2000s, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s policy towards Ukraine was aimed at restoring full control of the nation’s political, economic, and security systems. It contradicted Russian legal obligations as Ukraine had given up its nuclear weapons and Russia was among the guarantors of its territorial integrity. Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 resulted in heavy sanctions, which Moscow did not foresee, while Kyiv demonstrated better adaptability to the changing war situation and accelerated its integration with EU. Russia has been losing its status as a great power and the invasion has cost it dearly. Russian foreign and security policy in South Asia since 2014 is being questioned. The war between Ukraine and Russia created a profound global strategic and economic crisis for the South Asian countries. At the same time, it showed how smaller nations can defend themselves by building networks of clos partnerships with other neighbouring nations. The conflict also proved how manipulations with energy resources and food supplies can constrain such cooperation and how spread of narratives helps the aggressor state to disguise plans to build spheres of influence. Despite some attempts in South Asia to stay neutral between aggressor and its victim, or even to benefit from the war, withdrawal of the Russian troops from Ukraine would be beneficial for South Asian countries.
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    Ukraine Needs Hard Security Guarantees, NATO Membership Preferred
    (George Washington University, 2022) Burkovskyi, Petro; Haran, Olexiy
    The responsibility for preventing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine lies both on the West and on Ukrainian society, which was not unified about Ukraine’s NATO membership. All of the Russian talk about the NATO "threat" was just a cover-up for the real task of destroying Ukrainians as an independent nation. In the present situation, Kyiv is carrying the bloody burden of the European war alone, though with significant Western support. To prevent Ukraine’s and Europe’s failure in what appears to be a long-term struggle with Russia, it is necessary to recognize and accept the necessity of real security guarantees (unlike the Budapest-type 1990s "security assurances"). One option may be a non-bloc variant with real security guarantees provided by the US, the UK, France, and perhaps Turkey, Poland, and others. It should include immediate military support, including troops on the ground if Russia attacks Ukraine. A second option for Kyiv would be moving toward NATO membership. In this case, very painful compromises regarding Russian war crimes and some territories lost in 2014 may have to be considered.
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    Union européenne, OTAN : la société ukrainienne a fait son choix
    (2023) Haran, Olexiy; Burkovskyi, Petro
    La résistance ukrainienne s'inscrit dans un temps long, ouvert par l'indépendance de 1991 et confirmé en 2014. Une tendance continue a rapproché très largement l'opinion du pays de l'UE puis de l'OTAN, la conduisant à chercher une véritable séparation avec la Russie et surtout avec son héritage historique soviétique. Accélérant des processus déjà en cours, l'Ukraine entend sortir de la guerre comme une véritable démocratie européenne.